Introduction

Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory is discipline of group choices that are based on information about preference of voters of the group. In social choice theory, design of methods that aggregate the preference of voters has been studied. It is important to add an algorithmic perspective to the design of methods.
In social choice theory, a mechanisms is a procedure that determines a social decision based on a vote. More formally, for a set Ω of voting alternatives and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of selfish voters with various utilities, a mechanism is a function f : Ω n → Ω as a collective decision making system. Voters know the exact detail of the operation of the mechanisms before they actually vote, and each voter can find out her expected benefit of her utility in the case when every voter votes truthfully. Each voter may try to manipulate the decision of a mechanism by changing her voting to increase benefit from her personal utility. A voting which aims to manipulate the decision of a mechanism is called a strategic-voting. To the effect of making a fair decision, we are interested in mechanisms in which no voter can get a larger benefit by a single-handed strategic-voting. Such a mechanism is called a strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, a mechanism is called a group strategy-proof mechanism, if there is no coalition of voters such that each member in the coalition can simultaneously get a larger benefit by their cooperative strategic-voting.
Facility Game
The facility game is a problem in social choice theory where a location of the facility in a metric space will be decided based on locations of agents (votes by voters) and each agent tries to maximize benefit from her utility function defined based on the distance from her location to the location of the facility. In previous studies of facility games [1] - [4] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [10] , mechanisms are allowed to distinguish agents. In other words, the input of mechanisms is not only location information (i.e., where is reported) but also agents' information (i.e., who reports the location). On the other hand, there is a category of mechanisms which are called anonymous, that is, which do not use agents' information.
Another important aspect of mechanisms of facility games is how we can maximize the sum of the utilities over all agents, called the social utility, over all strategy-proof (or group strategy-proof) mechanisms. In general, the maximum value of the social utility attained by a strategy-proof (or group strategy-proof) mechanism is smaller than that attained just by choosing the best location of the facility. A possible measurement of the performance for a mechanism is a benefit-ratio, the ratio of the social utility attained by the mechanism and such a best possible value to the social utility.
We call a mechanism a randomized mechanism if the mechanism does not output a single facility location but outputs a probability distribution of the facility location over a metric space. In randomized mechanisms, the utility of agents is defined to be the expected value by the probability distribution. On the contrary, a mechanism which outputs a facility location is called deterministic. We call mechanism a p-candidate mechanism if the number of distinct outputs is p. In the obnoxious facility game, previous studies [3] - [5] focused on mechanisms which output the location of the facility from restricted locations in a metric space. More accurately, those studies first choose p candidates in a set of alternatives, and then they design p-candidate mechanisms which output a location of the facility from these p candidates.
In this paper, we consider group strategy-proof mechanisms in tree metrics. In Sect. 2, we review some studies related to social choice theory and facility game. In Sect. 3, we formulate a model of the obnoxious facility game, and describe our main theorem that characterizes strategy-proof mechanisms in tree metrics in such a way that there exists a p-candidate group strategy-proof mechanism if and only if the tree has a point to which every candidate has the same distance. Section 4 gives a proof to the necessary condition in the theorem, and Sect. 5 provides a proof to the sufficient condition in the theorem. In Sect. 6, we make a concluding remarks.
Related Works
In this section, we review some previous studies related to social choice theory and facility game. Moulin [8] studied social choice theory under the condition that the set of alternatives is the one-dimensional Euclidean space and each utility function is a single-peaked concave function. Moulin [8] characterized a necessary and sufficient condition of strategy-proofness on single-peaked preferences in the one-dimensional Euclidean space. After that, Border and Jordan [2] extended the result to characterize strategy-proof mechanisms in the multi-dimensional Euclidean space. Schummer and Vohra [10] applied the result of Border and Jordan [2] to obtain characterization of strategy-proof mechanisms when Ω is the set of all points in a tree metric or the set of all points in a graph metric which has at least one cycle.
In the typical facility game, Procaccia and Tennecholtz [9] proposed a group strategy-proof mechanism which returns the location of the median agent as the facility location when all agents are located on a path. Moreover, they designed a randomized mechanism. Alon et al. [1] gave a complete analysis on benefit-ratios of group strategy-proof mechanisms for the typical facility game in general graph metrics.
Cheng et al. [4] first studied group strategy-proof mechanisms for the obnoxious facility game in the line metric. They have designed a 2-candidate group strategy-proof mechanism and shown that for any set of locations reported by agents, a benefit-ratio of the mechanism is at most 3. Ibara and Nagamochi [5] gave a complete characterization of 2-candidate strategy-proof mechanisms and 2-candidate group strategy-proof mechanisms for the obnoxious facility game in general metrics and they proved that in arbitrary metrics, a 2-candidate group strategy-proof mechanism with a benefit-ratio 4 can be designed. Moreover, they have shown that in the line metric, there exists no p-candidate strategy-proof mechanism for any integer p ≥ 3.
Preliminaries
Mechanisms
Let R + be the set of nonnegative real numbers. Let Ω be a set of points, possibly infinite. A symmetric distance function d : Ω × Ω → R + holds the following conditions, for every point x ∈ Ω, it holds that d(x, x) = 0; for every two points x, y ∈ Ω, it holds that d(x, y) = d(y, x); and for every three
Throughout this paper, we use the notation d as a symmetric distance function. Let (Ω, d) denote a metric. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents, and assume that exactly one location of an undesirable facility needs to be decided. Let Ω agents ⊆ Ω denote a set of points to which any location that can be reported by an agent in N belong, and let Ω facility ⊆ Ω denote a set of points such that the facility can be located. A set of locations reported by agents in N is denoted by a location function χ : N → Ω agents , where χ(i) denotes the location reported by an agent i ∈ N.
Let χ be a location function. For a set Ω ′ ⊆ Ω of points, let N(χ, Ω ′ ) denote the set of all agents i ∈ N with χ(i) ∈ Ω ′ . For a location y ∈ Ω facility of the facility, the benefit β(y, χ(i)) of an agent i ∈ N is defined to be the distance from her location to the facility, i.e.,
For simplicity, for a set S ⊆ N of agents, we write by χ(S ) the multiset {χ(i) | i ∈ S } of locations reported by agents in S , and we denote by S the set N \ S . The multiset χ(N) is called a profile of N. Given a profile χ(N), a mechanism f outputs a facility location based on the profile χ(N), that is, f : Ω n agents → Ω facility . In the literature on the study of facility games, the following mechanism model appears [1] - [4] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [10] . The input to mechanisms is a location function χ and mechanisms distinguish each agent's report. For instance, for location functions χ and χ ′ of a set N = {1, 2} of agents and locations x, y ∈ Ω agents such that
. Anonymity is an important property of mechanisms. A mechanism f is called anonymous if it holds that f (χ(N)) = f (χ ′ (N)) for any two location functions χ and χ ′ of a set N of agents that admits a bijection σ on N such that χ(i) = χ ′ (σ(i)), for every agent i ∈ N (i.e., χ(N) = χ ′ (N) holds as multisets). In our model, every mechanism is anonymous, that is, the input is a multiset as a set of locations which all agent report.
In this paper, we consider that an intersection of multisets retains the highest multiplicity of elements in the sets. For example, for points a, b ∈ Ω and a multiset A = {a, b, b}, it holds that A ∩ Ω = {a, b, b}.
Next we review the definition of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness of mechanisms [1] , [4] , [5] .
Definition 1:
A mechanism f is strategy-proof (SP for short) if and only if no agent can benefit from misreporting her location. Formally, given a set N of agents and a location function χ, for any agent i ∈ N and any location function χ ′ such that χ({i}) = χ ′ ({i}), it holds that
Definition 2:
A mechanism f is group strategy-proof (GSP for short) if and only if for any group of agents, at least one agent in the group cannot benefit from misreporting her location simultaneously with the rest of the group. Formally, given a set N of agents and a location function χ, for any non-empty set S ⊆ N of agents and for any location function
For a mechanism f : Ω n agents → Ω facility , a location y ∈ Ω facility is called a candidate if there is a profile χ(N) ∈ Ω n agents such that f (χ(N)) = y and the set of all candidates of f is denoted by C( f ) ⊆ Ω facility . A mechanism with |C( f )| = p is called a p-candidate mechanism.
Tree Metric
In this paper, we define a tree metric based on the graph model due to Schummer and Vohra [10] . We define a graph G to be a closed, connected subset of Euclidean space. The graph is composed of a finite number of closed curves of finite length, which are called edges. The extremities and branch points of the curves are called vertices. A path is a minimal connected subset of G that contains two points x and y as its endpoints. A cycle in G is defined to be the union of two paths whose intersection is equal to the set of both their endpoints.
A tree T is defined to be a graph without cycles. A path with two endpoints in a tree is uniquely determined. For two points x and y in a tree, let P(x, y) denote the path with two endpoints x and y, and the distance d(x, y) between x and y is defined to be the length of path P(x, y), and there is a unique point z such that d(x, z) = d(z, y). We call such a point the middle point of x and y, and denote it by m(x, y). Note that d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y. In this paper, we consider the tree metric (T, d). Let T agents = T be a set of points where agents can exist and T facility ⊆ T be a set of points where the facility can be located. Given a mechanism f and a location function *** revised here *** χ, the benefit β(
A rooted tree is a tree such that one vertex of the tree is designated as a root. Let T be a rooted tree with rooted at a point µ. The parent y of a vertex x is the vertex one step closer to root r and lying on the same edge and x is called a child of the vertex y. For a vertex u and a child v of u, let (u, v) denote the edge joining u and v. A vertex x is called a descendant of a vertex v if v is in path P(µ, x) between the root µ and x. We define subtrees T [u] and T (e) specified by a vertex u and an edge e as follows. For each vertex u in T , let T [u] be the set of points z in the subtrees induced from T by u and the descendants of u, i.e., z is a point on P(u, x) for some descendant x of u in T . For each edge e = (u, v) in T , let T (e) ⊆ T be the set of points in e and T [v] .
We here observe a property on GSP mechanisms in the next lemma.
Lemma 1:
Let f be a mechanism in T . Let χ be a location function and c ∈ C( f ) be a candidate such that c = f (χ(N)). If there is a candidate c
then f is not GSP.
Proof. There is a location function χ
Therefore when the agents in S misreport their locations, all agents in S can benefit, that is, the mechanism f is not GSP by Definition 2. □
Definition 3:
We call a set C of locations in a tree T a peri-
The main result in this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1:
Let C ⊆ T facility be a set of p ≥ 1 points in a tree T . There is a p-candidate GSP mechanism such that C( f ) = C if and only if C is a perimetric distribution.
In the following two sections, we prove the necessity and sufficiency of Theorem 1, respectively.
Necessity of Theorem 1
This section proves the necessity of Theorem 1. Thus we prove the next.
Lemma 2:
Let f be a p-candidate mechanism in a tree metric (T, d) such that C( f ) is not a perimetric distribution. Then f is not GSP.
Let f be a p-candidate mechanism such that C( f ) is not a perimetric distribution. Hence p = |C( f )| ≥ 3 since C( f ) with p = |C( f )| ≤ 2 is always a perimetric distribution. Let c a and c b be a pair of two most distant candidates in C( f ). We define point µ = m(c a , c b ) and regard T as a rooted tree by designating µ as the root. We denote r = d(c a , µ) = d(c b , µ). Define C r ( f ) to be the set of candidates which are at distance r from the root µ, i.e., where it holds d(µ, c 1 ) < d(c, µ) for any c ∈ C r ( f ). Figure 1 
where Fig. 1 for an illustration of subsets A(e) and B(e) of T (e) for an edge e ∈ Ch(µ). Note that µ ∈ A(e) and A(e) \ {µ} ∅ for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ), since d(µ, c 1 ) < d(µ, c) and m(c 1 , c) ∈ T (e) hold for all candidates c ∈ C r ( f ) ∩ T (e) with e ∈ Ch(µ).
We here observe a property on the structure of set B(e) of an edge e ∈ Ch(µ).
Lemma 3:
Let f be a p-candidate mechanism in a tree metric (T, d) such that p ≥ 3 and C( f ) is not a perimetric distribution, and let µ ∈ T , c 1 ∈ C( f ) and C r ( f ) be defined in the above. Let χ 1 be a location function such that f (χ 1 (N)) = c 1 ∈ C( f ) \ C r ( f ). If N(χ 1 , B(e)) = ∅ for some edge e ∈ Ch(µ), then f is not GSP.
Proof.
Assume that there is an edge e ∈ Ch(µ) such that N(χ 1 , B(e)) = ∅. By definition of T (e), there is a candidate c in C r ( f ) ∩ T (e). To prove that f is not GSP by Lemma 1, Fig. 1 An illustration of root µ, candidate c 1 and sets C r ( f ), T (e), B(e) and A(e) for an edge e ∈ Ch(µ) in a tree T . it suffices to show that
For each agent i ∈ N(χ 1 , T (e)), where N(χ 1 , T (e)) = N(χ 1 , A(e)) by N(χ 1 , B(e)) = ∅, we have
On the other hand, for each agent i ∈ N \ N(χ 1 , T (e)), it holds that
as required. □ Now we are ready to prove Lemma 2. Proof of Lemma 2. Let χ 1 be a location function such that f (χ 1 (N)) = c 1 . See Fig. 2(a) for an illustration of profile χ 1 (N) and point c 1 in tree T rooted at µ. We can assume that N(χ 1 , B(e)) ∅ for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ), since otherwise f is not GSP by Lemma 3, and we are done. For each edge e ∈ Ch(µ), we select an arbitrary point t e ∈ A(e) \ {µ}. To prove Lemma 2, we introduce two location functions χ k (N), k = 2, 3 by modifying χ 1 (N).
Let χ 2 (N) be the profile obtained from χ 1 (N) by changing the locations of all agents i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e)) to t e for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ); i.e., For each edge e ∈ Ch(µ) and all agents i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e)), let χ 2 (i) = t e ∈ A(e) \ {µ}; and For all agents i ∈ N \ ∪ {N(χ 1 , B(e)) | e ∈ Ch(µ)}, let χ 2 (i) = χ 1 (i).
See Fig. 2(b) for an illustration of the new profile χ 2 (N). Note that χ 2 (N) χ 1 (N), because Ch(µ) ∅ and N(χ 1 , B(e)) ∅ for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ) by assumption.
Let c 2 = f (χ 2 (N)), and let e ′ = (µ, v) be the edge incident to root µ such that c 2 ∈ T (e ′ ). If e ′ ∈ Ch(µ) (i.e., T (e ′ ) ∩ C r ( f ) ∅) and c 2 µ, then we define e 2 to be e ′ . Otherwise (e ′ Ch(µ) or c 2 = µ), we choose an arbitrary edge in Ch(µ) as e 2 .
Let χ 3 (N) be the profile obtained from χ 1 (N) by changing the locations of all agents i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e)) to t e for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ) except e = e 2 ; i.e., For each edge e ∈ Ch(µ) \ {e 2 } and all agents i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e)), let χ 3 (i) = χ 2 (i) = t e ∈ A(e) \ {µ}; and For all agents i ∈ N \ ∪ {N(χ 1 , B(e)) | e ∈ Ch(µ) \ {e 2 }}, let χ 3 (i) = χ 1 (i).
See Fig. 2(c) for an illustration of the new profile χ 3 (N). Observe that profile χ 2 (N) is obtained from χ 3 (N) by changing the locations of all agents i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e 2 )) from χ 3 (i) = χ 1 (i) ∈ B(e 2 ) to χ 2 (i) = t e 2 ∈ A(e 2 ) \ {µ}. Note that χ 3 (N) χ 1 (N), because |Ch(µ)| ≥ 2, Ch(µ) \ {e 2 } ∅ and N(χ 1 , B(e)) ∅ for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ) \ {e 2 } ∅ by assumption. Also χ 2 (N) χ 3 (N), since N(χ 1 , B(e 2 )) ∅ by e 2 ∈ Ch(µ), as we have assumed that N(χ 1 , B(e)) ∅ for all edges e ∈ Ch(µ). Let c 3 = f (χ 3 (N)).
To know how location function χ k changes into χ 3 , k = 1, 2, we define the set N k,3 of agents whose locations change, i.e., N k,3 = {i ∈ N | χ k (i) χ 3 (i)}, and choose a special agent in N k,3 as follows.
For k = 1, we see that
We can assume that there is at least one agent i 1,3 ∈ N 1,3 such that
since otherwise f is not GSP with respect to a group S = N 1,3 by Definition 2 and we are done. Let e 1,3 ∈ Ch(µ) be the edge such that χ 1 (i 1,3 ) ∈ T (e 1,3 ) for agent i 1,3 ∈ N 1,3 .
We show that e 1,3 e 2 . Since 
For k = 2, we see that
We can assume that there is at least one agent i 2,3 ∈ N 2,3 such that
since otherwise f is not GSP with respect to a group S = N 2,3 by Definition 2 and we are done.
To prove Lemma 2, we derive the next inequality
which implies that f is not GSP by Lemma 1. To derive Eq. (4), we distinguish two cases: Case a. χ 1 (i 1,3 ) ∈ B(e 1,3 ) , we see from c 3 B(e 1, 3 ) that point m 1,3 lies on path P (χ 1 (i 1,3 ), c 3 ) . Hence   d(c 3 , χ 1 (i 1,3 )) = d(c 3 , m 1,3 ) + d(m 1,3 , χ 1 (i 1,3 ) ). ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e) ) to t e for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ), and (c) profile χ 3 (N) obtained from χ 1 (N) by changing the locations of all agents i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e)) to t e for each edge e ∈ Ch(µ) \ {e 2 }.
For edge e 1,3 ∈ Ch(µ), B(e 1, 3 c 1 ) ≥ d(c 1 , c), we  know c 1 B(e 1,3 ). Then χ 1 (i 1,3 ) ∈ B(e 1,3 ) and c 1 B(e 1,3 ) imply that point m 1,3 lies on path P (χ 1 (i 1,3 ) , c 1 ). Hence we have 3 , χ 1 (i 1,3 ) ).
By the above two equations and Eq. (1), we obtain
We claim that χ 3 (i) B(e 1,3 ) for all agents i ∈ N. Every agent i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e 1,3 ) ) has the location χ 3 (i) = t e 1,3 ∈ A(e 1,3 ) \ {µ} in profile χ 3 (N) by the definition of χ 3 and e 1, 3 e 2 . Also every agent i N(χ 1 , B(e 1,3 ) ) has a location χ 3 (i) B(e 1, 3 ) by the definition of χ 3 . This proves the claim.
By noting that c 3 B(c 1,3 ) in Case a, we see that, for each agent i ∈ N, it holds χ 3 (i) B(e 1,3 ) and thereby path P(χ 3 (i), c 3 ) does not pass though point m 1,3 ∈ B(e 1,3 ). Hence we have
Therefore by Eq. (2), for every agent i ∈ N, it holds that
Case b. c 3 ∈ B(e 1,3 ): To handle this case, we use the next claim, where a proof of it will be given later. and c 1,3 is larger than that between m 1,3 and c 3 , i. e., it holds that d (c 1,3 , m 1,3 ) > d(c 3 , m 1,3 ).
By Eq. (2), for every agent i ∈ N, it holds that
as required.
Finally we give a proof of Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 1. To prove the claim, it suffices to show that
Since 3 ) ) by Eq. (3), it futher suffices to prove that
We distinguish two cases: c 2 ∈ T (e 2 ) and c 2 µ; and c 2 T (e 2 ) or c 2 = µ. Case 1. c 2 ∈ T (e 2 ) and c 2 µ: We first show that µ P(χ 2 (i 2,3 ), c 2 ). By the definition of χ 2 , for any agent i ∈ N(χ 1 , B(e 2 )), χ 2 (i) = t e 2 . Then agent i 2,3 ∈ N 2,3 = N(χ 1 , B(e 2 )) has location χ 2 (i 2,3 ) = t e 2 ∈ A(e 2 ) \ {µ}. By assumption of µ c 2 ∈ T (e 2 ) in Case 1, we see that 3 ) ). From this, we see that for any candidate c ∈ C r ( f ) \ T (e 2 ), it holds that Hence for any candidate c ∈ C r ( f ) \ T (e 2 ), we have
This completes a proof of Lemma 2.
Sufficiency of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove the sufficiency of Theorem 1. Let C be a set of points in a tree T such that C is a perimetric distribution. When |C| = 1, any mechanism f with C( f ) = C outputs a unique facility location for all profiles of agents, and thereby for any agent set S , all agents in S cannot benefit by misreporting their location. Therefore the mechanism f is GSP. We consider the case that |C| ≥ 2. First we design a voting mechanism f with the set C of candidates. Let µ be the middle point between the most distant two points in C. Since C is a perimetric distribution, for any c, c
. If a point w ∈ {µ} ∪ C is on an edge (u, v) of T , then we regard w as a vertex of T and replace (u, v) with two edges (u, w) and (w, v). We regard T as a rooted tree by designating µ as the root. For each vertex u, let Ch(u) be the set of edges e = (u, v) such that there is at least one c ∈ C in T (e).
Let E denote the set of all edges in the tree T , where we assume without loss of generality that each point in C is an end-vertex of some edge in E. We define a lexicographical order between two vectors (a, b) and (a
Given a perimetric distribution C ⊆ T , we define a voting mechanism f as follows. We fix an arbitrary total order among all edges in E by a bijection id : E → {1, 2, . . . , |E|}. Although we will prove that the following voting mechanism f is GSP for any choice of total order id by Lemma 4, we design f so that C( f ) = C holds. To ensure this, we let f first select a total order id among all possible |E|! choices by some deterministic rule based on a given profile χ(N): For example, for the length d min of a shorest edge in T and the distance δ = min{d(c, x) | c ∈ C, x ∈ χ(N)} to C from χ(N), let k be the maximum integer with 1 ≤ k ≤ |E|! such that d min (k − 1)/|E|! ≤ δ, and choose the kth bijection among all |E|! bijections on E.
Given a profile χ(N), we let f select a total order id by the above rule and output f (χ(N)) = c * ∈ C so that path
is formed by choosing each edge e j = (u j , u j+1 ), j = 1, 2, . . . , q − 1 that satisfies the lexicographic order:
for all edges e ∈ Ch(u j ) \ {e j }. Figure 4 illustrates how the voting mechanism f determines path P(µ, c * ) from the root µ to the output c * ∈ C for a given profile χ(N) in a rooted tree T . Figure 5 illustrates an example of a tree T with a perimetric distribution C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 6 }. We show how the voting mechanism f determines the output c * to the profile χ(N) of 13 agents in Fig. 5 . To this profile χ(N), mechanism f first selects a total order id on the set of edges based on the distance from the locations of agents to the candidates in C, and assume that id such that id(a i ) = i, i = 1, 2, . . . , 12 is selected. Then mechanism f outputs c * = c 2 from C, because it constructs path P(µ, c Fig. 4 The voting mechanism f outputs a facility location c * such that path P(µ, c * )
for all edges e ∈ Ch(u j ) \ {(u j , u j+1 )}.
Fig
. 5 An example of tree T , a profile χ(N) of 13 agents and a perimetric distribution C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 6 }, where a total order id such that id(a i ) = i is selected by the voting mechanism f . u 3 = v 5 , u 4 = c * = c 2 ) with edges (u 1 , u 2 ), (u 2 , u 3 ) and (u 3 , u 4 ) that satisfy the following lexicographical orders: For edges a 1 = (u 1 , u 2 ), a 2 , a 3 ∈ Ch(u 1 ), it holds that (|N(χ, T (a 1 ))|, id(a 1 )) = (4, 1) ≺ (|N(χ, T (a 3 ) )|, id(a 3 )) = (4, 3) ≺ (|N(χ, T (a 2 ))|, id(a 2 )) = (5, 2); For edges a 5 = (u 2 , u 3 ), a 4 ∈ Ch(u 2 ), it holds that (|N(χ, T (a 5 ))|, id(a 5 )) = (1, 5) ≺ (|N(χ, T (a 4 ))|, id(a 4 )) = (2, 4); and For edge a 6 = (u 3 , u 4 ), a 7 ∈ Ch(u 3 ), it holds that (|N(χ, T (a 6 )), id(a 6 )) = (0, 6) ≺ (|N(χ, T (a 7 ) )|, id(a 7 )) = (1, 7).
We first observe that C( f ) = C; i.e., for any specified candidate c ∈ C with |C| ≥ 2, there is a profile χ c (N) such that f (χ c (N)) = c. Given a candidate c ∈ C, choose another point c ′ ∈ C \ {c} such that the distance from c ′ to the path P(µ, c) is maximized, and place all the agents in N on a point p ′ on the edge (u ′ , c ′ ) between c ′ and its parent u ′ of c ′ so that the total order id selected by the rule satisfies that id(e) < id(e ′ ) for any edges e in P(µ, c) and e ′ not in P(µ, c). 
(by triangle inequality), as required.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we characterized a possible distribution of candidates (locations of the facility that can be output) by GSP mechanisms in a tree metric. That is, for a set C of p points in a tree, there exists a p-candidate GSP mechanism whose output set C( f ) is equal to C if and only if C is a perimetric distribution. This explains the non-existence of p ≥ 3-candidate GSP mechanisms in a line metric (e.g., [5] ), because no set C with at least three points can be a perimetric distribution in a line metric. However, it remains open to show whether the set C( f ) of candidates of an SP mechanism f in a tree metric also needs to be a perimetric distribution or not. It would be interesting to evaluate the benefit ratio of the proposed GSP mechanism f . Also it is left as a future work to examine a possible distribution of candidates of SP or GSP mechanisms in a metric on a more complex graph or in an Euclidean space.
